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A B S T R A C T
Disclosure of annual general meeting 
(AGM) minutes on the corporate 
website is considered as additional 
disclosure. Consequently, Listing 
Requirements states compulsory 
disclosure of corporate information. 
In this regard, the awareness of 
compulsory disclosure of information 
among all Malaysian listed companies 
in 2017 was below expectations. 
Despite the role of AGM minutes 
as documented proof of meeting, 
the management had been reluctant 
to disclose AGM minutes on the 
corporate website unless demanded by 
the shareholders. This paper focuses 
on previous mandatory disclosure 
of discussions on key matters after 
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AGM minutes among 261 listed 
companies based on the financial 
year ended December 31, 2016. The 
findings indicated that shareholder 
activism and the role of grey directors 
exerted influence on the disclosure 
of AGM minutes on the corporate 
website. Undoubtedly, management 
and investors have contributed 
toward voluntary disclosure in 
line with the government’s role to 
enhance shareholder rights. Besides, 
grey directors’ contribution towards 
information disclosure has remained 
relatively unexplored.
1.    Introduction
Slack and Shrives (2010, p. 84) claimed that researchers and professionals 
strongly believe that the demand for voluntary disclosures by stakeholders have 
been increasing for the last two decades. Recently, a majority of researchers 
argued that there has been less effort given to papering between corporate 
governance and voluntary disclosures. In fact, there have not been many studies 
regarding AGM minutes on corporate websites even though it is acknowledged 
that financial reporting and disclosures are significant for a firm’s performance 
and good governance especially towards its investors (Healy & Palepu, 2001, 
p. 406).
The intention of this paper is to highlight the importance of AGM minutes 
on corporate websites. Even though there has been research regarding AGMs 
such as formalities and speeches at AGMs (Catasús & Johed, 2007); the format 
of AGM minutes (Nyqvist, 2015); the way top management conducts AGMs 
and accesses the accounts (Carrington & Johed, 2007) and the procedure of 
AGMs (Apostolides, 2010), there is still a lack of studies which focuses on the 
disclosure of AGM minutes on corporate websites. Thus, this study intends to 
explore the influence of shareholder participation and grey directors on AGM 
minutes displayed on corporate websites.
According to the Minority Shareholders Watch Group (MSWG), “one of 
the best practices which MSWG advocated over the years is the publication 
of Annual General Meeting (AGM) minutes on the listed issuer’s website in a 
timely manner. It was aimed that all publicly listed companies (plc) will take the 
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initiative to publish a meaningful summary of key matters arising at the AGM, 
which, among others, should include pertinent questions raised at the AGM and 
the Board’s responses as well as the full attendance list of the directors at the 
AGM” (website MSWG). 
So far, studies conducted by Samaha, Khlif, and Hussainey (2015) 
on voluntary disclosures focused on corporate social responsibility (CSR), 
intellectual capital, directors’ remuneration, dividend policies, forward-looking 
information, risk disclosures, and internet disclosures. Despite the role of AGM 
minutes as prima facie evidence of documentation, there is a noticeable lack of 
studies on the disclosure of AGM minutes on corporate websites. It is noted that 
an AGM can be stated as the place where all members are called to generate 
forums for discussions in accordance with company law which provides valuable 
opportunities for promoting organizational accountability (Cordery, 2005, p. 2). 
In other words, the AGM should be a place for members to support the closing 
of the accounting year (Catasús & Johed, 2007: p. 172).
In Malaysia, AGM occurs once a year whereby company executives (top 
management) together with the board of directors (non-executive and independent 
directors) and shareholders/investors meet. The focus point of this paper is 
aligned with Section 143(1) of the previous Companies Act 1965 whereby all 
companies established in Malaysia (public or private) are required to convene 
its first AGM within eighteen (18) months from the date of incorporation of the 
company in Malaysia (Malaysia Companies Act 1965, amended 1999).
However, effective January 31, 2017, due to the transition period from the 
Companies Act 1965 to the new Companies Act 2016, there was a major change 
regarding the convening of an AGM. Beginning January 31, 2017, Section 
340(1) of the Companies Act 2016 states that “every public company shall hold 
an AGM in every calendar year besides other meetings held during that period, 
to transact the following business: 
the laying of audited financial statements and the reports of the directors a) 
and auditors;
the election of directors in place of those retiring;b) 
the appointment and the fixing of the fee of directors; andc) 
any resolution or other business of which notice is given in accordance d) 
with this Act or the Constitution.”
 In summary, the Companies Act 1965 stressed the importance of the AGM 
to be held once in every calendar year either by the circulation of resolution 
or physical AGM regardless whether they are public or private companies. 
In contrast, the Companies Act 2016 (CA 2016) only required publicly listed 
companies (PLCs) to hold physical AGMs once in every calendar year. This is 
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no longer applicable for private companies in Malaysia (Companies Act, 2016 
on Section 340(1): p. 320)1.
It is notable that the implementation of the CA 2016 is a benchmark 
towards good governance and applicable to all sections except Section 241 and 
Division 8 of Part III. Interestingly, the new Companies Act 2016 highlighted 
that under Section 340(3) of CA 2016, only public companies whether listed or 
non-listed need to convene a physical meeting within eighteen (18) months from 
the date of incorporation of the company in Malaysia.
With the updated Main Market Listing Requirements, the outcome of 
the AGM which consists of the total voting results will be made available to 
the public on the day the meeting is conducted. Meanwhile, for companies that 
applied, they are required to ensure that their corporate    websites are active and 
accessible to the public2. In fact, the company is solely responsible in ensuring 
that the link to company announcements appears in its corporate website(s).
Based on the regulations, Section 343 of the CA 2016 states that AGM 
minutes is a formal record of proceedings at a meeting and is considered prima 
facie evidence. Thus through the AGM minutes, management and investors will 
know the list of participants during the meeting, the agenda discussed, questions 
raised by the audience, time frame of the meeting, total voting of resolution(s), 
and outcome of the meeting which can benefit existing and potential shareholders 
who are unable to attend or are not involved in the event as mentioned in the 
Best Practice Guide on AGMs for Listed Issuers published by MAICSA-Bursa 
Malaysia Berhad in 2016 (MAICSA, 2016).
The rest of this paper is organised as follows; Section 2 briefly presents 
the literature review and hypotheses development; Section 3 discusses the 
research methodology; Section 4 highlights the results and analysis, and Section 
5 presents the conclusion and contributions of this paper.
 
 
2.    Literature Review
Currently, there is no accepted standard guideline regarding AGM minutes even 
though generally there are a few formats of minutes prepared and drafted in 
Malaysia. Each type and format of minutes depends on specific usage where it 
fulfills certain objectives (Foo, 2019, p. 25). To date, the Securities Commission 
of Malaysia, Institutional Investor Council of Malaysia, and the Minority 
Shareholders Watch Group have launched the AGM Corporate Governance 
Checklist for Shareholders on February 5, 2020 which includes the importance 
of AGM minutes to enhance a better perspective of corporate governance 
(Securities Commission of Malaysia, 2020, p. 16).
Collectively, the AGM minutes acts as evidence of a written record 
and must be audited by a licensed auditor, yearly. In fact, the Chairman used 
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the AGM minutes as confirmation of a true record of the previous meeting 
(The Malaysian Association of the Institute of Chartered Secretaries and 
Administrators [MAICSA], 2016). However, there is an issue regarding the 
need for AGM minutes to be disclosed on corporate websites which had been 
non-mandatory in Malaysia. The compulsory disclosure of AGM minutes on 
corporate websites was effected in 2016 with the amendment of the Main Market 
Listing Requirements Chapter 9-Continuing Disclosure Paragraph 9.21(2) (b) 
which stipulates that “a listed issuer must publish the following information on 
its website such as ...summary of the key matters discussed at the AGM, as soon 
as practicable after the conclusion of the AGM” (website Bursa Malaysia). 
The gap in the literature is related to the reluctance of the PLCs to publish 
their AGM minutes on their corporate websites even though Bursa Malaysia 
Berhad has released a letter to the board of directors to comply with Paragraph 
9.21(2) for both Main Markets and ACE Markets. This can be seen as the MSWG 
noted that only the top 100 listed companies published their AGM minutes on 
their corporate websites from 2017 onwards instead of all listed companies in 
Malaysia.
There has been a lot of studies which focused on the meeting process 
(Apostolides & Boden, 2005; Nyqvist, 2015), implementation of corporate 
governance (Apostolides, 2010), conduct of meetings (Carrington & Johed, 
2007; Schwartz-Ziv & Weisbach, 2013), and criteria on information of corporate 
website disclosures (Kelton & Yang, 2008; Martherly & Burton, 2005). However, 
there is a lack of studies on the disclosure of AGM minutes on corporate websites 
in Malaysia and other countries. The publication of AGM minutes on corporate 
websites can be considered as one of the new prospects in voluntarism that has 
been given less attention by researchers, either locally or globally.
In this paper, the voluntary disclosure is extended by examining the AGM 
minutes on corporate websites in Malaysian PLCs with the financial year ended 
December 31, 2016 and focused on companies listed under the Main Market. 
Apart from examining the disclosure of AGM minutes on corporate websites, 
this paper also addressed the impact of shareholders and grey directors’ activism 
(through voting percentage) on such disclosures. In 2018, Bursa Malaysia made 
it compulsory for all Malaysian PLCs to provide a corporate website and publish 
key matters discussed at the AGM as soon as possible after the conclusion of the 
meeting (Bursa Saham, 2018, p. 2).
 
 
2.1      Trend of AGM Minutes on Corporate Website
Table 1 shows that 48 percent of the top 100 Malaysian PLCs published their 
AGM minutes in 2016 which is slightly better compared to the period from 2013 
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to 20153. It indicated the willingness of the companies to disclose AGM minutes 
on their corporate websites which reflected good governance (Rita & Salleh, 
2016).
Moreover, the Malaysia-ASEAN Corporate Governance Report (2015) 
revealed that calls by MSWG for a voluntary publication of AGM minutes on 
corporate websites was well received by most Malaysian PLCs. Most of the listed 
companies agreed to publish AGM minutes within 30 days after the conclusion 
of their AGM event (Malaysia-ASEAN Corporate Governance Report, 2015).
Table 1. Table Extract of Minority Shareholder Watch Group for All Top 100 
Malaysian PLCs between 2012 and 2016










Companies with board charters 94 97 80 70 38
Companies with code of ethics 90 77 68 57 58
Companies which published AGM minutes 48 37 26 7 1
Companies which published M&A 41 28 22 11 8
Companies which disclosed individual 
director remuneration
43 33 35 39 34
Companies with dividend policies 41 38 35 38 34
Companies with whistle blowing policies 86 70 51 48 42
Companies with corporate responsibility 
policies
94 93 97 94 90
Companies which disclosed training 
attended by each of its directors
80 65 59 65 56
Annual financial report released within 
four months
99 99 82 81 81
*Source: Minority Shareholder Watch Group Media Release (2016).
In comparison, Table 2 reported specific AGM minutes disclosed on 
corporate websites before and after the implementation of the CA 2016. The 
table indicated that there was an increase in disclosures of AGM minutes from 
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nine percent (2016) to 37 percent (2017). The huge jump in percentage was due 
to initiatives enforced by the regulatory bodies that required all listed companies 
either the top 100 Malaysian PLCs or non-top 100 Malaysian PLCs to publish 
their AGM minutes or key matters on their corporate websites as soon as possible 
after their meetings.
In accordance with the CA 2016, which began in 2017, several voluntary 
disclosure items such as the establishment of dividend policies, whistle blowing 
policies, implementation of corporate responsibility policies, disclosure of 
training attended by individual directors, and the release of annual financial 
reports (FY) within four months became either not available or mandatory as 
stipulated by the Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements.
Table 2. Table Extract of Minority Shareholder Watch Group for All Listed 
Companies between 2016 and 2017
Other Disclosure 2017 (%)* 2016 (%)
Companies with board charters 86 82
Companies with code of ethics 60 57
Companies which published AGM Minutes 37 9
Companies which published M&A n/a n/a
Companies which disclosed individual director remuneration 11 10
Companies with dividend policies n/a n/a
Companies with whistle blowing policies n/a n/a
Companies with corporate responsibility policies n/a n/a
Companies which disclosed training attended by each of its 
directors
n/a n/a
Annual financial report released within 4 months n/a n/a
*Source: Malaysia-ASEAN CG Report (2017). Note: (*) n/a represents not available. 
Previous studies described shareholder activism as how shareholders 
exert influence by way of their involvement and engagement with company 
management through monitoring and control mechanisms based on governance 
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structure (Akmal Musa & Ismail, 2016; Gillan & Starks, 2000). Empirical 
evidence has divided shareholder activism into public pension funds, coordinated 
groups of investors, and individual investors (Gillan & Starks, 2000, p. 277–
278).
To reiterate, the need for active participants especially in corporate policy 
has affected managers’ interests. In a study involving 130 active investors of 
firms from the United States of America showed that managers tend to react 
toward activism based on disclosure information (Bourveau & Schoenfeld, 2017, 
p. 30). As such, passive shareholders focused on additional disclosures tend to 
vote against resolutions if a firm does not fulfill their preferences (Bourveau & 
Schoenfeld, 2017: p. 3).
On the other hand, activist shareholders are more likely to become 
proactive for the sake of their investors. The manager is aware that once the 
company increases its vulnerability, there is more susceptibility in terms of 
exposure to activism (Klein & Zur, 2009, 2011). Unfortunately, even though 
shareholder activism by institutional investors has been increasingly prominent 
over the last few years, studies which investigate the effects of such activism 
towards voluntary disclosures are relatively limited (Gillan & Starks., 2000).
In accordance with De Jong, Mertens and Roosenboom (2006). 
Shareholders’ voting at general meet and Roosenboom (2006), shareholder 
activism during a meeting on dominant shares tends to influence agency cost 
and maximize shareholders’ wealth. This paper can contribute to the literature as 
not many studies are focused on the emergence of shareholder activism (voting 
percentage) especially in terms of the numbers in favor or against the resolution 
for voluntary disclosure of AGM minutes on corporate websites.
2.2      Issue with Shareholder Activism
Van der Elst (2012) studied whether there was a relationship between shareholder 
rights and shareholder activism in annual general meetings. The result of a 
comparison among five countries showed no significant relationship between the 
number of items or the importance of items to be voted at general meetings and 
the attendance of shareholders. However, it was highlighted that shareholders 
have the power to attend and support items in the agenda during AGMs. There 
is also the issue of free-riding or apathetic shareholders during AGMs which 
suggests the need for a more in-depth analysis regarding shareholder activism 
(Van der Elst, 2012, p. 63).
Bourveau and Schoenfeld, (2017) who studied the relationship between 
voluntary disclosure and shareholder activism suggested that, broadly, 
shareholder activism plays a crucial determining role in voluntary disclosures. 
The evidence also suggests that managers are more receptive to disclosures once 
shareholders are active in their firm.
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Van der Elst (2012) identified shareholders as the owners of the company. 
In essence, shareholders are the supreme and final decision makers of the 
company even though they only own company shares and not the company 
management. Currently, the power of shareholders is only limited to voting on 
issues governed by the law or to allocate decision-making power in the general 
meeting. This limitation of power leads to active participation and the tendency 
to vote for or against resolutions at general meetings namely, through having 
share vote percentage (Van der Elst, 2012, p. 40–41).
Previous studies on Malaysian companies in 2001–2002 regarding the 
impact of family-controlled companies and board composition towards corporate 
transparency indicated that companies with more affiliated directors brought 
significant changes to corporate disclosures (Wan-Hussin, 2009).
Generally, majority shareholders tend to dominate the decision-making 
process instead of minority shareholders (Catasús & Johed, 2007, p. 178). This is 
because other than attending general meetings, shareholders also exercise their 
power through voting resolution (voting percentage). Traditionally, in Malaysia, 
most of the dominant voting process was either by a show of hands or by poll 
(CA 2016 Section 146)4. However, since the new CA 2016, Bursa Malaysia 
requires all resolutions in general meetings to be voted by poll. The proposal to 
exercise voting by poll is also recommended by the latest Malaysian Code on 
Corporate Governance (MCCG 2017-Practice 12.3).
Does share voting influence the decision to disclose AGM minutes on 
corporate websites? As mentioned earlier, AGM minutes on corporate websites 
are still relatively new in Malaysia. However, in the United Kingdom, it has 
already established the United Kingdom Code of Corporate Governance as “...
when, in the opinion of the board, a significant proportion of votes have been cast 
against a resolution at any general meeting, the company should explain when 
announcing the results of voting what actions it intends to take to understand the 
reasons behind the vote result...” (Council, 2012).
Therefore, the importance of the number of votes (voting percentage) 
whether in favor or against the resolution can have a significant impact on the 
disclosure of AGM minutes on corporate websites. Based on the statement, it 
is predicted that shareholder participation can influence the disclosure of AGM 
minutes on corporate websites.
Thus, the following hypothesis is posited:
H1: There is a positive relationship between shareholder participation and 
disclosure of AGM minutes on corporate websites.
2.3      Emerging Grey Directorship
Previous studies showed that the function of grey directors is mainly to receive 
less attention compared to other directors. The agency theory suggests that 
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agency conflicts happen due to the separation of ownership and control in a firm. 
Through this theory, the directors bear responsibility for the company’s future 
value in disseminating private information to the public (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976).
Grey directors can be defined as directors that have social ties with 
company management such as a former director, possess shares in the company, 
and provide beyond monitoring and advisory functions of the boardroom 
(Hsu & Wu, 2014). According to Baysinger and Butler (1985), grey directors 
comprise a mixture of executive and independent directors who provide proper 
administrative and multiple tasks (as cited in Hsu & Wu, 2014). It is also 
reported that companies with a large proportion of grey directors in the board 
composition can hinder corporate failures such as in the United Kingdom (Hsu 
& Wu, 2014).
 Borokhovich, Boulton, Brunarski and Harman (2014) found that grey 
directors with shares in a company could jeopardise their position as directors 
of the company. Based on a sample from 370 top executives and board chairs 
from 1978 to 2007, Borokhovich et al. (2014) noted that a firm’s succession 
plan is influenced by the power of grey directors. The results also revealed 
that grey directors’ ownership helps to align company interest with that of the 
shareholders.
 To date, it has been debated based on empirical evidence whether 
the grey director tends to act as advisor instead of monitoring the boardroom 
(Vicknair, Hickman & Carnes, 1993). Unlike executive or independent directors, 
the grey director plays a crucial role as independent advisor and decision maker 
of the company. 
Thus, it is posited that grey directors could affect management strategy 
in voluntary disclosure. A paper by Ibrahim and Angelidis (1995) revealed that 
outside directors (which include grey directors) tend to influence company 
performance because of their strong mutual relationship with the stakeholders 
as these directors know their expectations and are able to entertain investors’ 
demands. The result of the paper indicated that outside directors provide 
greater corporate responsibility but a weaker orientation towards the economic 
performance of companies. It is predicted that grey directors can influence the 
disclosure of AGM minutes on corporate websites.
Hence, the second hypothesis is as follows:
H2: There is a positive relationship between grey directors and disclosure of 
AGM minutes on corporate websites.
3.    Methodology
In this paper, we selected companies that have annual reports made publicly 
available in their corporate websites and the Bursa Malaysia website. We chose 
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2016 as the financial year ended for our sample because the preferred year 
ended by the PLCs is either in June or December. Hence, on January 31, 2017, 
the implementation of the new CA 2016 superseded the previous acts together 
with the latest Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG, 2017) in 
April 2017 and enhancement of the Bursa Malaysia Securities Berhad Listing 
Requirements subsequent to the release of the MCCG (Corporate Governance 
Guide 3, 2017). 
The initial sample was 274 companies. We excluded 13 companies due to 
missing data or unfulfilled criteria. The final sample with the required data was 
261 companies listed under the Main Market of the Bursa Malaysia website. Apart 
from collecting annual reports, notices of annual general meetings, outcomes 
of general meetings and corporate governance (CG) reports, we also collected 
board profiles, company profiles and other data from the Bloomberg database, 
Thomson Reuters DataStream database and respective corporate websites.
As mentioned earlier, this paper was conducted based on companies listed 
in the Main Market of Bursa Malaysia for the financial year ended December 31, 
2016. This paper also applied secondary data as the main data collection. The 
information on company characteristics and directors’ profiles were collected, 
coded and extracted from annual reports published under bursa announcements. 
In addition, the disclosure of AGM minutes on the corporate website was 
downloaded, analyzed and extracted from each company’s corporate website.
3.1 Measurement of Variables
The measurement of variables in this paper, adopted from studies by Kassim, 
Ishak, and Manaf (2013, p. 322) were proxies based on company characteristics 
and directors’ profiles namely market sector, business activity, directors’ profiles 
and related governance information.
The ASEAN CG Scorecard served as a benchmark because it provides 
details and rigorous methodology against international best practices to assess 
corporate governance performance among ASEAN countries consisting of 
Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, and the Philippines. The 
scorecard helps investors and public issuers to compare and contrast their 
corporate information for a transparent investment decision-making process. 
Besides, according to the ASEAN Corporate Governance Scorecard Country 
Reports and Assessments from 2011 to 2014, it encourages foreign direct 
investments among the six participating ASEAN member countries.
3.2	 Definition	of	Each	Variable
3.2.1 Dependent variable—AGM minutes on corporate website
A detailed scoring index of this paper was adopted from the checklist used by 
Haniffa and Cooke (2005) with minor changes to fit the context of Malaysian 
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PLCs. A level disclosure of AGM minutes was collected by observing each 
Malaysian publicly listed corporate website under the column: “corporate 
governance”, “media release”, “investor relations” or its related section(s) to 
identify whether the companies published their AGM minutes or not. Besides, 
we also emailed to each firm that did not publish its AGM minutes to confirm 
the non-disclosure of AGM minutes on its corporate website. The dependent 
variable, VD of this paper is the level of voluntary disclosure of AGM minutes 
measured by score (0) if there is no disclosure of AGM minutes on the corporate 
website and score (1) for otherwise.
3.2.2 Independent variable—Shareholder activism
For the independent variables in this paper, data were collected from annual 
reports of each corporate website, CG reports, Bloomberg database and Thomson 
Reuters DataStream database of the sampled firms.
With regard to shareholder participation, our paper indicated participation 
by measuring the resolution with share votes (unit) against the agenda of the 
meeting divided by the total number of shares (unit). Percentage share votes 
against the resolution indicate the visibility of shareholder activism during the 
AGM event. Therefore, shareholder participation, SA_vote % in this paper was 
measured by way of share voting which was calculated with share votes (unit) 
divided by the total number of shares (unit). Share votes (unit) was measured 
based on the outcome of the meeting from the Bursa Announcement by identifying 
the higher total number of votes for and against each resolution (shareholder 
participation ratio at AGM). Meanwhile, the total number of shares (unit) was 
collected from the total number of the issued share capital of the companies as 
per financial year ended December 31, 2016. Shareholder participation, SA vote 
(%)= share votes (unit)/ total number of shares (unit)*100.
3.2.3 Independent variable—Grey directors
The second independent variable was the grey director. The details of the 
measurement for a firm assigned with grey directors, BOD_grey% was measured 
by classification: “executive” represented the position as executive director 
of the company; “independent non-executive” represented the position as an 
independent non-executive director of the company and “grey” to represent 
the position as grey director/non-independent non-executive director of the 
company. For directors with BOD_grey%, by using the scoring index, the total 
number of grey directors of each firm was combined, recorded and coded by the 
total number of grey directors in each firm.
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3.2.4 Control variable—Board size
According to Kassim et al. (2013), previous studies had shown that large 
companies preferred to establish various diversifications in business such as 
Sime Darby Group of Companies, FGV Group of Companies (formerly known 
as Felda Global Ventures Group of Companies), KPJ Group of Companies and 
Genting Group of Companies. Theoretically, large size companies, require 
large capital injection which leads to the diversity of its investors, BODsize. 
Therefore, the role of the board of directors such as executive, non-executive or 
grey director with a single tier or two-tier leadership could influence disclosure 
of the AGM minutes on the corporate website. A large size company requires a 
large boardroom to control and monitor the performance of the company. Hence, 
a mixture of board diversity and position could provide better decision-making.
From a negative perspective, it is argued that the large number in board 
size could create chaos and a tendency for personal benefit instead of fulfilling 
company objectives. From a positive perspective, diversity in the board of 
directors such as the presence of independent non-executive directors could help 
the management and owners (investors) to aim for profit maximization. This is 
because independent non-executive directors work for the company and provide 
checks and balances in decision-making. Besides that, the more independent 
the directors the more voluntary information disclosed by the company. Due 
to this reason, BODsize is expected to influence voluntary disclosure of AGM 
minutes.
3.3 Empirical Models
The following model was developed to achieve the research objectives used to 
examine the disclosure of annual general meeting on the corporate website:
Where, VD means voluntary disclosure of AGM minutes on the corporate 
website, independent variables represented by BOD grey% to indicate grey 
directors, SA vote% to denote shareholder participation and BODsize to mean 
board size. Details of the operational definitions of the variables, measurements 
and sources are shown in Table 3.
VD = 0+ 1 SA_vote% + 2 BOD_grey% + 3 BODsize + i
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Table 3. Operational Definition of each Variable of the Study






dv •     indicate voluntary 
disclosure index
•     (1=disclose 










iv •     share votes (unit)/ 









Grey director iv •    step 1: Classification 
grey director




•     step 2: Total 
number of 
grey directors/






BODsize Board size cv •     indicated based on 
the total number of 






Indicator(s): dv denotes dependent variable, iv denotes independent variable and cv 
denotes control variable of the study.
4.    Analysis of Results
This section reports on the general findings, from descriptive statistics followed 
by Pearson partial correlation, one-sample t-test and regression results. It also 
aims to show the relationship between the dependent and independent variables 
in the study. The results confirm the two hypotheses posited. The data is analyzed 
based on the methodology described earlier.
This chapter reported the findings with discussions and suggestions for 
future research. This chapter arranged with a summary of general findings, 
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future research recommendations and the conclusion. The result will be analysed 
based on the three research questions (RQs) and research objective (ROs) using 
SPSS software. The chapter aims to shows the association between dependent 
variables and independent variables. The data acquired will be analysed based 
on the methodology explained in earlier chapters.
Figure 1. Distribution of AGM minutes on corporate website 
among Malaysian public listed companies.
From Figure 1, based on 261 companies listed under the Main Market of 
Bursa Malaysia, it was found that 78 companies (29.89%) did not publish AGM 
minutes on the corporate website (indicated by “0”) whereas 183 companies 
(70.11%) disclosed the AGM minutes on the corporate website (indicated by 
“1”). The willingness of the listed companies to publish AGM minutes on the 
corporate website reflected their alignment with the initiatives of the MSWG to 
promote good governance through transparency and accountability5. 
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics on AGM Minutes on Corporate Websites, Grey 
Directors, Shareholder Activism and Board Size.
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
VD 0.00 1.00 0.70 0.45
SA_vote% 2.76 99.66 58.95 20.53
BOD_grey% 0.00 60.00 19.56 16.63
BOD size 4.00 15.00 7.51 1.85
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posited. The data is nalyzed based on the methodology described earlier. 
 This chapter reported the findings with discussions and suggestions 
for future research. This chapter arranged with a summary of general 
findings, future research recommendations and the conclusion. The result 
will be analysed based on the three research questions (RQs) and research 
objective (ROs) using SPSS software. The chapter aims to shows the 
association between dependent variables and independent variables. The 
data acquired will be analysed based on the methodology explained in 
earlier chapters. 
 
Figure 1. Distribution of AGM minutes on corporate website among 
Malaysian public listed companies. 
 
From Figure 1, based on 261 companies listed under the Main Market of 
Bursa Malaysia, it was found that 78 companies (29.89 percent) did not 
publish AGM minutes on the corporate website (indicated by “0”) whereas 
183 companies (70.11 percent) disclosed the AGM minutes on the 
corporate website (indicated by “1”). The willingness of the listed 
companies to publish AGM minutes on the corporate website reflected their 
alignment with the initiatives of the MSWG to promote good g vernance 
through transparency and accountability5.  
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From Table 4, based on the sample of 261 companies, grey directors were 
in the range of 0 to 60 percent per company, with a mean of 19.56 and a standard 
deviation of 16.63. Share vote percentage ranged from 2.76 percent to 99.66 
percent with a mean of 58.95 and a standard deviation of 20.53. Board size, 
ranged from 4 to 15 directors, with a mean of 7.51 and a standard deviation of 
1.85.
Interestingly, there were several companies with more than half of its 
composition dominated by grey directors. Even though there were companies 
with no grey directors from the table, surprisingly there were companies with 
more than eight grey directors such as Bintulu Port Holdings Berhad and PBA 
Holdings Berhad. The awareness of the role played by grey directors concurred 
with results by Abdulmalik, Ahmad and Aliyu (2015) in that the proportion 
of grey directors in the boardroom was significantly and positively related to 
accrual and real earnings management compared to independent directors. This 
result also supported the argument that the existence of grey directors could 
influence disclosure of AGM minutes which was seldom explored by previous 
researchers.
Meanwhile, for shareholder participation via proxies by shareholder 
vote percentage at AGM events, the results showed that the minimum was 2.76 
percent and the maximum was 99.66 percent in terms of shareholders exercising 
their voting rights. Therefore, Frontken Berhad had a lower shareholder vote 
whereas BIMB Berhad, MMC Corporation Berhad, OSK Holdings Berhad, 
Classic Scenic Berhad, Petronas Gas Berhad, and SP Setia Berhad had higher 
shareholder votes during AGM events. This reflected the assertiveness of the 
shareholders as to how the management should utilize their shareholdings for 
profit maximization. The active participation of the shareholders or by way 
of the presence of a corporate representative (proxy) was in accordance with 
the MCCG 2017 in encouraging more shareholders’ attendance during AGM 
events.
Overall, for board size, public listed companies have a board size range 
of four to 15 directors. For instance, PBA Holdings Berhad has 15 directors 
comprising nine grey directors and six independent non-executive directors 
wholly owned by the state government. The composition of board size acts as a 
control variable that may influence disclosure of AGM minutes on the corporate 
website among Malaysian PLCs. The main reason is because having a mixture 
of directors of different characteristics, work experiences and level of education 
could lead to more willingness to disclose AGM minutes on corporate websites 
as encouraged by MSWG and Bursa Malaysia.
Accordingly, Table 5 of the partial correlation shows the dependent 
variable, VD; independent variables, SA_vote% and BOD_grey% and the 
control variable, BODsize. Both the two independent variables produced a strong 
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correlation of 0.206** and 0.211**, respectively (significant 2-tailed). In fact, 
the control variable also provided a good correlation with 0.124* (significant 
2-tailed) in this paper.
Table 5. Pearson Partial Correlation
Variable VD SA_vote % BOD_grey% BODsize
VD 1.00
SA_vote% 0.206** 1.00
BOD_grey% 0.211** 0.261** 1.00
BODsize 0.124* 0.343** 0.260** 1.00
Notes: ** indicated the significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Tables 6 shows the results based on one-sample t-test. The one-sample 
t-test was used to confirm the assumption that the dependent variables, VD01 
were measured either at internal or ratio level, that the data were independent 
and not related, with no significant outliers and that the dependent variables 
should be normally distributed. Thus, there was a significant difference in the 
mean (VD, SA_vote%, BOD_grey% and BOD size) between the sample and 
overall population and that the average mean for VD was 0.70, SA_vote% was 
58.95, BOD_grey% was 19.56 and BODsize was 7.51 compared to the overall 
population average.
Table 6. One-sample T-test
t-value Mean 95 % Confidence Interval of the Difference
Lower Upper
VD01 24.698 0.701 0.650 0.760
SA_VOTE% 46.385 58.954 56.452 61.457
BOD_GREY% 18.992 19.560 17.532 21.588
BODSIZE 65.494 7.506 7.280 7.730
Based on Table 7, the R Square of the paper was 0.007 and the adjusted R 
square was 0.059 which was slightly low due to minimum variables tested in this 
paper. The multiple regression showed that while disclosure of AGM minutes 
on corporate website was constant, VD, both the independent variables, SA_
vote% and BOD_grey% produced highly significant results, 0.002 and 0.001, 
18                                   The International Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 15, No 2, 2020 : 1-24
respectively. These results supported H1 and H2 that inside forces (such as grey 
directors) do influence the disclosure of AGM minutes on corporate websites 
and outside forces (such as shareholder participation during AGM) also provided 
significant impact on the disclosure of AGM minutes on corporate websites. 
However, the control variable, BODsize did not have a significant impact on 
the relationship with VD01, SA_vote%, and BODgrey%. Thus BODsize did not 
influence the disclosure of AGM minutes on corporate websites.












SA_vote% 0.003 0.001 0.153 2.343 0.020
BOD_grey% 0.005 0.002 0.164 2.582 0.010




Based on the results in Section 4, preliminary analyses were conducted to 
ensure no violation of the assumptions of normality, linearity, multicollinearity 
and homoscedasticity. R Square value was 1 percent of the variance by including 
board size as a control variable which was relatively low. The statistically 
significant contribution, was indicated by the Sig. F change value for the line 
(.000). In addition, the ANOVA table indicated that the model was significant 
(F(261) = 6.41 < .001). Meanwhile, the Coefficients table, showed that the Sig. 
Column, three variables, SA_vote% (beta = 0.15), SA_vote% (beta = 0.16) and 
BODsize (beta = 003) made a unique contribution towards voluntary disclosure 
of AGM minutes on corporate websites. As shown, control measures were 
statistically non-significant, with grey directors recording a higher beta value 
followed by shareholder participation and board size.
The pivotal role of shareholder participation towards voluntary disclosure 
concurred with De Jong et al. (2006) in that shareholders become proactive 
in exercising their rights as company owners. In addition, as mentioned by 
Bourveau and Schoenfeld (2017), the more shareholders utilize their voting 
rights, the more it may affect the voluntary disclosure information, in this case, 
the AGM minutes on corporate websites.
Despite the few studies on grey directors, Hsu and Wu (2014) stressed 
that grey directors are also part of the directorship of companies. By playing 
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their role as outsider directors, grey directors are free from the management of 
companies and therefore are able to influence company decisions as suggested 
by Angelidis and Ibrahim (1995). The role of grey directors should be measured 
in a broader perspective as grey directors serve not only to fit the composition of 
directorship but they can also influence board directorship in aligning shareholder 
demands and needs.
Thus,
H1 There is a positive relationship between shareholder 
participation and disclosure of AGM minutes on corporate 
websites.
Accepted
H2 There is a positive relationship between grey directors and 




5.    Conclusion
In a nutshell, this paper examined the relationship between voluntary disclosures 
of AGM minutes on the corporate website based on a sample of Malaysian public 
listed companies for the financial year ended December 31, 2016. It revealed that 
disclosures in AGM minutes in 2016 were relatively low, at 47 percent compared 
to other disclosures from all listed companies. This suggests that several factors 
may have influenced the willingness of company management to disclose their 
AGM minutes on the corporate website.
There are several noteworthy contributions in this paper. To the best of 
our knowledge, this paper is the first to highlight the importance of voluntary 
disclosure of AGM minutes on the corporate website. Next, this paper has 
also examined the link between shareholder proxies (by way of shareholder 
participation voting at AGM events) and grey directors on the disclosure of 
AGM minutes on the corporate website.
Besides, this paper offers some insights on shareholder participation and 
grey directors using data from a developing country, Malaysia. This paper in 
particular, complemented previous research which emphasized the importance 
of grey directors in influencing voluntary disclosures.
This paper also noted that meaningful disclosure of AGM minutes on the 
corporate website in Malaysia was relatively low in 2016 during the period of 
study. Subsequently, the new Companies Act followed by the Malaysian Code 
on Corporate Governance and the Corporate Governance Guide 3 came into 
effect in 2017. Eventually based on the Minority Shareholder Watch Group 
media released in 2017, almost 78 percent of the top 100 PLCs disclosed their 
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AGM minutes on the corporate website. The disclosures were aligned with Bursa 
Malaysia requirements in Paragraph 9.21(2) (b) on the disclosure of AGM key 
matters after a meeting is held.
The findings showed that grey directors and shareholder activism (voting 
percentage) did influence the level of AGM minutes of the disclosure. The results 
supported the government initiatives in introducing the Malaysian Code for 
Institutional Investors 2014. As such, this paper has emphasized the importance 
of grey directors and shareholders which are relatively unexplored. Future 
studies should be conducted on extensive factors which lead to the disclosure of 
AGM minutes on the corporate website as the way forward in promoting good 
corporate governance. 
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Endnotes
1 Malaysia Companies Act 2016. Retrieved from https://www.ssm.com.my/
Pages/ Legal_ Framework/Document/Act%20777%20Reprint.pdf (Section 
340(2) on Annual general meeting).
2 Fullarticle. Retrieved from https://www.bursamalaysia.comsites/5bb54b
e15f36ca0af339077a/assets/5c10c71ef67d7c7c0037bfc7/ICN_1_2018.
pdf (Issuers Communication Corporate Website for Listed Issuers (ICN 
1/2018).
3     Minority shareholder watch group or MSWG was established in 2000 as one 
of the government’s initiative to protect the interests of minority shareholders 
through shareholder activism by encouraging good governance amongst 
public listed companies with the objective of raising shareholder value over 
time.
4     Section 332(1) of the CA 2016 and Paragraph 8.29A(1) of the Bursa Malaysia 
Listing Requirements stated that any resolution by plc laid in the notice of 
AGM must be voted by poll.
5    On July 18, 2018, Bursa Malaysia Berhad released a letter to the board of 
directors (listed issuers/corporations) on Compliance with Paragraph/Rule 
9.21 of the Main/ACE Market Listing Requirements.
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